Metro and its predecessor transit agencies have a long and complex history of transit policing.
[Page down to end for a key resource list]
Our predecessor agencies, Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD : 1964-1993), Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Agency (LAMTA : 1958-1964), Metropolitan Coach Lines (MCL : 1953-1958), and Pacific Electric Railway (PE : 1911-1953) had a security department of special agents and patrolmen who conducted undercover and other surveillance policing work to enforce laws, rules, fares, etc.
They functioned as the main liaison to Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for crimes that required arrests. Before 1958, transit operators were private companies with zero tolerance for fare evasion because they were private companies with no tax subsidies, operating 100 percent from farebox revenues.
There was a longstanding, almost 100 year old relationship between transit agency seuciryt departments and LAPD for ensuring safety and security on the transit system, bus and rail.
Crime rates took a significant upward turn in Los Angeles during the late 1960s.
On January 8th, 1967, the first transit operator was murdered while in service during a robbery aboard an SCRTD bus. 71 year old John Glenn Hartzell had served as a transit operator for 40 years.
The upsurge of crime affected the entire region, but bus operators –– often because they carried cash and provided change to customers –– became targets of violent attacks. The murder sparked agency-wide outrage and the implementation of an exact fare policy in 1969.
Violence against bus operators catalyzed an emergency procurement to retrofit buses with voice radio and silent alarm systems.
SCRTD did have a security force known as the “Special Agents” (you might think of them as akin to today’s Transit Security Officers, or TSOs). But they operated on a shoestring budget, had been stripped of their peace officer status years before, and lacked the authority to make arrests (many of them didn’t even carry arms).
And, despite decreases in robberies during the early 1970s thanks to the exact fare policy, violent crimes on buses continued to rise. According to the November 2, 1973 SCRTD Board of Directors special meeting, there had been 95 assaults on bus operators through the first 10 months of 1973, exceeding the total for all of 1972 and the combined total for the years 1970 and 1971. Police Department statistics reveal that between 1963 and 1973, crime in Los Angeles has increased by 71 percent while the population has grown only by approximately 15 percent.
SCRTD took additional steps in the late 1970s through the early 1980s to change the legal status of their Security Department’s Special Agents to armed peace officer transit police, and sent everyone to the required training courses to earn it.
In August 1976, the SCRTD Board voted to pursue peace officer status for its agents.
Recruitment for the new transit police department happened in stages. SCRTD leaders recruited experienced law enforcement officers from local jurisdictions for the staff command positions. They, in turn, initially hired off-duty officers from Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department to staff patrol shifts while they recruited full-time officers.
These SCRTD employees were particularly valuable to the fledgling police department because most of them had been bus operators –– for a time, you had to work for two years as a bus operator before you could apply as a Special Agent. For this reason, these employees knew the transit system intimately: its patrons, its culture, and its security system and protocols.
During this period, because RTD’s service area crossed so many jurisdictions, policing transit proved challenging for existing law enforcement agencies (given that LA County contains 88 cities, this is still an issue today).
In a 2024 interview with Metro’s The Source, SCRTD (and later, LACMTA) Chief of Police (1989-1997) Sharon Papa, explained:
“They were slow to respond to calls for service, especially if the bus was moving. For example, police officers knew that a bus traveling along Wilshire Boulevard from downtown would move out of their jurisdiction and into someone else’s fairly quickly. That particular line would pass through three different cities policed by the Los Angeles Police Department, Beverly Hills Police Department, and the Santa Monica Police Department, so unless the bus stopped and waited for them, officers didn’t ‘chase’ the bus.”
The bus operators’ union (back then it was UTU, or United Transportation Union) had the most at stake. Throughout the 1970s, members had staged sickouts and protests demanding better police protection. The union was crucial to the passage of state legislation that authorized SCRTD to employ its own peace officers to police the transit system. Initially included under section 830.4 of the California Penal Code (later section 830.33), the transit police launched in 1978. SCRTD wasn’t alone in this effort, incidentally. BART launched its own police force around the same time.
Between 1978 and 1997, the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) operated its own police force. At its height, with over 500 officers, it was the 10th largest police force in California and the largest transit police force in the nation.
The police force was very small initially; in 1980, there were only 37 full time officers –– hardly enough to manage a network of 2,600+ buses and 220 bus lines carrying over 1.3 million riders per day.
Nevertheless, by 1981, the transit police had made over 1000 arrests, and had also reported significant decreases in robberies and crimes against persons. By 1985, SCRTD employed 70 sworn officers and 40 security guards.
Throughout the mid-1980s, the police force continued to professionalize.
It developed specific training tailored to transit crimes and outlined new deployment strategies and safety tactics. Clad in navy-blue uniforms, the transit police had their own crime analysts, statistics analysts, and performed their own sting operations. They successfully launched a “ride-along” program staffed by undercover decoy officers dressed as passengers. This way, they were able to thwart pickpockets and illegal gambling, and even a large counterfeit bus pass ring.
Graffiti and vandalism posed a big challenge for SCRTD during the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1989, the transit police created an entire task force –– the Graffiti Habitual Offender Suppression Team (GHOST) –– to address the escalating severity of vandalism on the system.
Buses were ideal targets for taggers because they became, in Papa’s words, “rolling billboards” for their tags. The year before the pilot program began, SCRTD had spent $13 million on graffiti abatement.
The transit police department was initially ridiculed by other police agencies for staffing a misdemeanor task force; that is, until freeway signs and overpasses became tattooed with graffiti. The SCRTD (and later, LACMTA) transit police department ended up becoming the model for graffiti suppression emulated by other law enforcement agencies, including the statewide California Highway Patrol.
One might ask: “If the transit police force accomplished so much, why did they disappear?”
The transit police never had a smooth ride, and they faced scandals and bad publicity like many other law enforcement departments. Papa’s predecessor had left the agency after being accused of nepotism and ticket fixing. A few incidents of officer misconduct had brought negative attention to the transit police. Several ex-officers accused the agency of tolerating cronyism and brutality, racial profiling, responding slowly to crimes, and failing to adequately screen recruits. “The RTD police is to law enforcement what the appendix is to the human body –– useless,” one former officer told the Los Angeles Times in 1991.
The merger between SCRTD and the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) –– creating our present-day Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) –– does not explain the downfall of the transit agency’s police force.
Rather, the end of the in-house transit police force was closely tied to the reintroduction of rail to Los Angeles for the first time in 30 years –– an ambitious and historic plan that created unprecedented excitement … and uncertainty.
Security would be paramount. Rail’s success, officials believed, had everything to do with how safe riders felt on the trains. Moreover, there was suddenly money on the table for law enforcement. The passage of Proposition C by LA County voters –– the half cent sales tax passed in 1990 –– carved out 5% for rail and bus security. For the first time, transit police would have a dedicated funding stream.
As the $877 million Metro Rail Blue Line (now, the A Line) neared completion, the question of who would police it became the subject of passionate debate.
The 22-mile light rail line that connected Downtown Los Angeles to Downtown Long Beach passed through some high crime areas known as gang turf. And the transit police were severely understaffed. Could they really take this on?
Leaders were divided. LACTC –– the agency that oversaw public transit and highway policy, and which had actually built the Blue Line –– wanted the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department to police it. In survey after survey, LACTC officials found that “fear of crime” would prevent substantial numbers of people from riding. LACTC had been feuding with SCRTD for years; it wasn’t surprising that the rival agencies would clash over transit security, too.
In early 1990, an SCRTD board vote awarded the Blue Line policing contract to the in-house transit police, but, under intense pressure from LACTC, the Los Angeles Mayor’s office, and the County Board of Supervisors, the SCRTD board reversed its decision and awarded the contract to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department at a cost of $12 million — double the cost of Papa’s bid. Her SCRTD police force was suddenly tasked with policing only buses for the next two years.
The battle over the contract to police the Metro Rail Red Line became even more vehement.
Even though the Blue Line was much longer than the Red Line (which was only 4.4 miles at this time, extending from Union Station to Westlake / MacArthur Park), the Blue Line was a light rail system –– newspapers still called it a “trolley.”
As it traveled (mostly) at grade, it seemed airier and safer. However, the Red Line, by contrast, was a bonafide subway.
Getting Angelenos to ditch their cars and travel underground would hinge on having top-notch security. The Los Angeles Police Department’s bid pledged to put 56 officers on the system at a cost of $6 million –– $4 million more than the plan proposed by the in-house transit police.
The in-house transit police ultimately prevailed –– partly because vast funding discrepancies between policing on rail ($1.25 per rider) and on buses (3 cents per rider) had come to light, and the Los Angeles Police Department’s bid would make the gap even more egregious.
Despite this victory, the seeds of the transit police’s dismantlement had already been planted.
The fact that high-ranking officials publicly doubted Metro’s ability to police its own rail lines was a huge blow to public perceptions of competency.
Papa changed some of her tactics –– putting undercover officers in uniforms, for example, so her police force would be recognized by the public for the work they did. “Seeing is believing,” she frequently told journalists. But she couldn’t protect the police force from politics.
While the transit police proved to be very effective under Papa’s leadership –– she made a point to recruit officers who had the flexibility and people skills needed to succeed on a transit system –– her department struggled against the perception among other law enforcement agencies that they were a “second-rate” police force.
Part of this was due to the fact that many of the issues that they addressed weren’t felonies but what we would today call violations of the Code of Conduct, i.e. people eating, drinking, smoking, and intimidating riders by playing loud music on the system.
“In law enforcement, most police officers like to focus on the major felonies; they want to take the big gangsters to jail, so to speak,” Papa said in a 1992 interview. “Here we focus on quality-of-life issues.” Minor offenses like graffiti and smoking might not grab all the headlines, but they made up the vast majority of transit crimes, negatively impacted everyone on the bus, and factored heavily into decisions to ride.
Republican businessman Richard Riordan was elected Mayor of Los Angeles in 1993, which also put him on the Metro Board of Directors. While campaigning, he promised to add 1,000 new officers to Los Angeles Police Department.
The City of Los Angeles was experiencing fiscal shortfalls at the time, so Mayor Riordan went looking for alternative ways to fulfill his campaign promise. He worked to get the agreement of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to disband the existing Metro Transit Police.
“One city, one police department” became the new battle cry. Sensing a shift in the winds, the LASD and LAPD submitted a plan to take over policing MTA’s entire transit system in December 1993, proposing to “merge” the transit police with their departments. This sparked several years of debate about who was best equipped to police the transit system.
Supporters of the merger argued that:
- It would eliminate duplicate administrative units at LACMTA, saving money
- It would reduce the unit cost of the LACMTA’s law enforcement and security program ($75,000 per full-time employee [FTE] for the partnership compared to $82,000 per FTE for the LACMTA Transit Police)
- The Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department could utilize a range of law enforcement services, including calling on special weapons and tactics units and helicopter response teams
- It would put more officers on the street who could respond to any call, not just transit crimes, since transit crimes often spilled on or off of transit
- Many people believed that the Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department had more rigorous policing protocols
Detractors of the merger argued:
- LACMTA would lose the ability to control costs, hire and train personnel, and develop and implement their own policies and procedures
- LACMTA wouldn’t have any say over redeploying resources or addressing emerging crime issues
- It could potentially reduce the number of sworn officers patrolling the system
- LACMTA would no longer have a police force with in-house expertise and dedication to working on the transit system
The agreement sent half of the law enforcement responsibilities to the Los Angeles Police Department and the other half to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and then had Metro contract back for transit policing services.
The five County Supervisors and the Mayor of Los Angeles plus his three mayoral appointees made up a majority of the Board, so this was approved.
An anonymous transit police office has written this history of that period. The two policing agencies ironically called this a “merger” and have since renewed these contracts.
In April 1995, Metro’s Executive Management Committee voted to support AB1478 (Martinez) that would have placed San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA : 1999- ) Police Department and Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART : 1972- ) in the same section of California Law as BART as other municipal police departments. However, when it came before the Metro Board of Directors, it was voted down.
Later in 1995, Metro CEO Franklin White bought this issue up again in a December report, so perhaps AB1478 died in committee because the board voted to oppose it.
Penal Code Section 830 et al, includes transit district police with the rest of the police forces, but down in 830.33, not the desired 830.1, with additional information here.
We cannot be sure what all the distinctions are between being listed under penal code 830.1 versus 830.33, other than what is recorded in the Metro Board of Directors minutes from April 1994 (Item 47), under Chief Papa’s concerns. CEO Franklin White brought up Section 830.1 again in December 1995.
In June, 2023, Metro’s Board of Directors receives the findings of a feasibility study for reconstituting a Metro Police Force program.
On June 27, 2024, Metro’s Board of Directors approved a proposed implementation plan for Metro Police.
In May, 2025, Metro introduced its selection for head of its newly reconstituted in-house public safety department. Chief William “Bill” Smith had spent 27 years rising through the ranks at Los Angeles Police Department, and came to Metro after eight years at the helm of the San Francisco Police Department where he led bold reforms and earning national recognition for building trust and reducing crime.
He’ll lead a new police force and be in charge of coordinating security for some of the world’s biggest events happening right here in Los Angeles, such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, the 2027 Super Bowl and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
“Real public safety is about more than enforcement. It’s about trust, transparency and working with the community,” said Metro Board Chair Janice Hahn. “Chief Scott understands that deeply.”
LACMTA has been listening to riders, frontline staff and the community. The message has been clear: We need a leader who can deliver safety, fairness and accountability. We believe Chief Scott is the right leader to do it.
LACMTA CEO Stephanie Wiggins put it this way: “This is a defining moment for Metro’s public safety strategy. We need someone who’s calm under pressure, emotionally intelligent and ready to lead with empathy. Chief Scott brings all of that and more.”
In San Francisco, he completed an ambitious 272-point police reform initiative, reduced use-of-force incidents, improved clearance rates and piloted smart crimefighting tools like license plate readers and drones to tackle organized theft.
“This is an incredible opportunity,” said Chief Scott. “How many people get to build a department from day one? I’m honored to be back in LA and even more honored to help Metro create something that reflects the values of this city.”
Chief Scott officially stepped into his new role in June, 2025.
IN CONCLUSION
Today, we face different issues than we faced during the 1980s and 1990s.
In 1997, we didn’t even have a system for counting unhoused persons in Los Angeles County. In 2023, there were 75,518 unhoused.
In 1997, hardly anyone had heard of fentanyl. Today, we’re facing the largest opioid epidemic we’ve ever faced in our history. In 1997, we had three rail lines that covered 46.3 miles. Today, we have six rail lines that cover 109 miles.
And yet, many of the issues we face today are more similar to years gone by than they seem. We are still working hard to protect our bus operators from senseless assaults. We’re still dealing with the same “quality of life” issues on our buses and trains (smoking, drinking, loud music, litter, etc.) that compromise our riders’ experience.
And as Metro’s transit system continues to expand, our contracted law enforcement still struggles to police a 1,447-mile service area that spans multiple jurisdictions, with costs going up every year.
As our Metro Ambassadors have shown us, we’re learning that there’s a lot of value in having an intimate knowledge of the transit system and its customers, just like the old champions of SCRTD’s transit police.
KEY RESOURCES
1973: SCRTD General Manager Jack Gilstrap submitted his Status Report on Violence and Vandalism on Public Transit in Los Angeles to the SCRTD Board of Directors at their November 2nd meeting (as recorded in the meeting minutes). The report recounts incidents since the 1960s and the rise in transit crime since the early 1970s. The first transit operator killed on duty occurred in 1968.
1976: The initial SCRTD resolution for peace officers can be found here.
1981: A February, 1981 SCRTD Headway employee news magazine article titled “Undercover cops on buses arrest nearly 700” explains how three months of intensive undercover work resulted in 681 arrests for felony violations, misdemeanor infractions, and warrants.
1981: A March, 1981 SCRTD Headway employee news magazine article outlines efforts on transit police recruitment.
1983: The Technical Report: Crime Impact Analysis of SCRTD Metro Rail Project (84p. PDF) summarizes the analysis of crime-impacts of the proposed Metro Rail system. It explains that protection from criminal victimization is one of the most important criteria for transit use from a passenger point-of-view, and notes that it can determine the success or failure of achieving the Metro Rail objectives for Los Angeles. The report’s introduction notes that five years after Metro Rail begins operation, major changes in the urban areas surrounding some of the key station sites are to be expected. High-rise offices, mixed-use facilities (offices and residences) may be developed in Hollywood, along parts of the Wilshire Corridor and in the downtown Central Business District. Taken as a whole, these changes in urban behavior patterns have important implications for the future of urban crime in Los Angeles.
1989: The Peer Review Panel Report of SCRTD Transit Police asserts that the configuration of the SCRTD Police Department indicates an organizational structure that is inappropriate for addressing the task that faces SCRTD at the time, and in the future. A high attrition rate and a
“total lack of career commitment at the Police Officer and Sergeant level” contributes to an already deteriorating capability to handle both current and future law enforcement demands. The report states that personnel strength is inadequate for current demands and the expectation that this problem can be overcome in the near term, without significant changes, is very low.
1990: An SCRTD Headways employee news magazine article profiles Sharon Papa, the agency’s selection as Police Chief. A nine-year veteran of the force, Lieutenant Papa became one of just a handful of women transit police chiefs nationwide at the time. She initially moved on to the Los Angeles Police Department, and later became the Hermosa Beach (CA) Chief of Police. She retired in 2019.
1992: The final Metro Transit Police Collective Bargaining Agreement (91 p. PDF)
1992: Episode 6, Part 3 of the SCRTD Transit 2000 TV series airs. This SCRTD Transit Police episode interviews Chief Sharon Papa and other transit police officer interviews about their jobs, their patrol beats, and how they understand transit culture and our patrons.
1996-1997: The undoing of Metro’s own Police department can be found in this Board report and this Board report, as well as these meeting minutes.
1997: One can compare the 1997 costs in the reports above with the current (2016) contract.
1999: This transit police history was written in 1999 by Metro’s Police Department staff. It serves as a sort of capstone to the dissolution of the department. Its authorship remains unknown, and contains no citations. Library staff are unsure about the reference to special agents losing peace officer status in the 1950’s, but it is believed to be related to changes in definitions within state law.
2003-2004: The MyMetro employee news product reports on the effort to re-establish Metro’s own police force. Additional information is found in this Metro Board item and in these Metro Board meeting minutes, as well as this subsequent Metro Board receive and file item.
2006: The report of the American Public Transportation Association’s Peer Review Panel on Security Services for Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority is released. The report recommends that a comprehensive feasibility study be conducted prior
to making a final decision, a comprehensive transition plan would have to be developed, LACMTA would have to support a budget in excess of 5% limits in the initial years, and a 10-year commitment, as a minimum, would be needed.
2023: In June, Metro’s Board of Directors receives the findings of a feasibility study for reconstituting a Metro Police Force program.